California Control Systems Engineer Bus. & Prof. Code § 6701 Attorney Fee Petition Mechanics: PE-NNNNN License Verification at search.dca.ca.gov as Primary Welch Anchor (THE ONLY § 6701 Control Systems Engineer Page — DISTINCT FROM Electrical Engineer PE-EE, Mechanical Engineer PE-ME, and Chemical Engineer PE-ChE; ISA-61511-1 Functional Safety SIS Advisory [PURE KETCHUM]; IEC 62443-3-2 Industrial Cybersecurity Risk Assessment Advisory [PURE KETCHUM]; TWO PRIVATE STANDARDS ON ONE PAGE), CCP § 1021.5 Private Attorney General Mandatory Attorney Fees

Statutory Framework: Bus. & Prof. Code § 6701 and PE-CSE Licensure — Control Systems Engineer Requirements, Scope of Practice, ISA-61511-1 [PURE KETCHUM], IEC 62443-3-2 [PURE KETCHUM], and CCP § 1021.5 Mandatory Attorney Fees

California Business and Professions Code § 6701 defines control systems engineering as a branch of professional engineering encompassing the design, specification, and analysis of industrial automation and control systems, safety instrumented systems (SIS), distributed control systems (DCS), programmable logic controller (PLC) safety application software, SCADA systems, functional safety lifecycle management, and layer of protection analysis (LOPA) for process industry facilities, utilities, and critical infrastructure. § 6701 requires that control systems engineering documents — including SIS functional design specifications, safety requirement specifications (SRS), SIL verification reports, alarm management philosophy documents, DCS control narrative specifications, and cybersecurity risk assessments for SCADA and IACS systems — be prepared and stamped by a PE-CSE licensed by BPELSG. § 6785 prohibits unlicensed engineering practice; a person who prepares and stamps control systems engineering documents without a valid PE-CSE commits § 6785 unauthorized engineering practice, actionable under CCP § 1021.5 when the litigation vindicates a public interest in safe industrial automation and control systems protecting California workers, facility operators, and the public. Primary Welch anchor: BPELSG License Verification at search.dca.ca.gov (PE-NNNNN module, PE-CSE designation).

ISA-61511-1-2016 FUNCTIONAL SAFETY: SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEMS FOR THE PROCESS INDUSTRY SECTOR ADVISORY — THE ONLY PAGE IN THE FEE-PETITION-MECHANICS SERIES WITH AN ISA-61511 FUNCTIONAL SAFETY SIS ADVISORY — PURE KETCHUM: ISA — International Society of Automation (founded 1945, Research Triangle Park NC) is a private nonprofit professional organization developing standards for automation, instrumentation, and control systems. ISA-61511-1-2016 (Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector, Part 1) establishes the functional safety lifecycle requirements for SIS in the process industries. Key ISA-61511 requirements applicable to control systems engineering design documents include: (1) LOPA (layer of protection analysis) to determine the required safety integrity level (SIL) for each safety instrumented function (SIF) — SIL 1 (PFD 0.1 to 0.01), SIL 2 (PFD 0.01 to 0.001), SIL 3 (PFD 0.001 to 0.0001); (2) safety requirement specification (SRS) documenting the process safety time, safe state definition, demand rate, required risk reduction factor (RRF), and proof test interval; (3) SIS architecture design including redundancy (1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo3 voting), diagnostic coverage (DC), and proof test coverage (PTC) to achieve required PFD; (4) functional safety assessment (FSA) at design completion and pre-startup confirming the SIS achieves the required SIL for each SIF. A control systems engineer whose SIS design achieves a lower SIL than LOPA requires — creating a 5× to 10× worse probability of dangerous failure on demand — directly creates an unmitigated process risk with potential for worker fatalities or toxic gas releases. ISA-61511 standards create no statutory fee-shifting; they are PURE KETCHUM advisories.

IEC 62443-3-2 SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT FOR SYSTEM DESIGN ADVISORY — THE ONLY PAGE IN THE FEE-PETITION-MECHANICS SERIES WITH AN IEC 62443-3-2 INDUSTRIAL CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY — PURE KETCHUM: The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC, founded 1906, Geneva) is a private international standards organization preparing and publishing international standards for electrical and electronic technologies. IEC 62443-3-2 (Security Risk Assessment for System Design) establishes the methodology for industrial automation and control system (IACS) cybersecurity risk assessment as part of the IEC 62443 series for industrial cybersecurity. Key IEC 62443-3-2 requirements applicable to control systems engineering design documents include: (1) zone and conduit model — identification of security zones (logical or physical groupings of IACS assets with common security requirements) and conduits (communication channels between zones); (2) security level target (SL-T) determination for each zone based on consequence severity (safety, environmental, financial) and attack likelihood; (3) cybersecurity risk assessment for SCADA systems documenting threats, vulnerabilities, and residual risk after countermeasures; (4) integration of ICS-CERT advisories and known IACS vulnerabilities into the risk assessment. A control systems engineer who prepares a SCADA design for critical infrastructure — water treatment, wastewater, pipeline, or power generation — without an IEC 62443-3-2 security risk assessment omits the foundational cybersecurity analysis protecting against unauthorized control system access. IEC 62443-3-2 standards create no statutory fee-shifting; they are PURE KETCHUM advisories.

Three-Track Harm: SIL 2 SIS PFD Underachieved Toxic Gas Release ($285K), ESD Valve Partial Stroke Test Omission Gas Plant Fire ($195K), and SCADA Cybersecurity Assessment Omitted Water Treatment Attack ($95K)

• UNLICENSED CONTROL SYSTEMS ENGINEER STAMPS SIS FUNCTIONAL DESIGN SPECIFICATION FOR HIGH-PRESSURE SEPARATOR WITHOUT PE-CSE LICENSE (BPELSG CONFIRMS NO PE-NNNNN PE-CSE IN DATABASE) — LOPA REQUIRES SIL 2 (PFD ≤ 0.01) FOR HIGH-HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INSTRUMENTED FUNCTION — ISA-61511 SIL VERIFICATION REPORT NOT PREPARED — AS-BUILT SIS ARCHITECTURE ACHIEVES PFD = 0.05 (SIL 1 ONLY — 5× WORSE THAN REQUIRED) — HIGH-PRESSURE SEPARATOR OVERPRESSURE EVENT — PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE FAILS TO RESEAT — TOXIC H⊂2;S GAS RELEASE — THREE PROCESS WORKERS HOSPITALIZED — $285,000 CAL/OSHA PENALTY AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS. A California petroleum refinery was upgrading its crude distillation unit and required a new safety instrumented system (SIS) for the high-pressure separator. A process safety engineer with no BPELSG PE-CSE (BPELSG confirms no PE-NNNNN PE-CSE in the database) prepared and stamped the SIS functional design specification. The LOPA performed during the process hazard analysis (PHA) identified the high-high pressure SIF as requiring SIL 2 (RRF ≥ 100) to reduce the frequency of an overpressure event with H⊂2;S release from 0.5/yr to < 0.005/yr. The unlicensed engineer designed a 1oo1 (single) SIS loop with a pressure transmitter, SIL-rated logic solver, and a final element (ESD valve). An ISA-61511 SIL verification was not performed. An independent PE-CSE retained during post-incident investigation calculated the as-built PFD = 0.05 for the SIL 2-demanded SIF — reflecting 1oo1 architecture with proof test interval of 12 months and no redundancy — achieving only SIL 1. During routine operations, an overpressure transient in the high-pressure separator triggered the SIF; the ESD valve failed to close due to a stuck actuator not caught by any diagnostic (no redundancy, no partial stroke test specified). The pressure relief valve opened and failed to reseat. An H⊂2;S gas cloud formed; three nearby workers were hospitalized with respiratory injuries. Cal/OSHA PSM Unit assessed a maximum penalty and the facility incurred workers’ compensation and litigation costs totaling $285,000.
• UNLICENSED ENGINEER STAMPS GAS PLANT EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN (ESD) SYSTEM DESIGN WITHOUT PE-CSE — ISA-61511 SECTION 11.6.3 PARTIAL STROKE TEST (PST) SPECIFICATION OMITTED FROM SAFETY REQUIREMENT SPECIFICATION — ESD BALL VALVE SEAT SEIZED DUE TO BUILDUP — ESD VALVE DOES NOT FULLY CLOSE ON DEMAND DURING COMPRESSOR ISOLATION — HIGH-PRESSURE GAS RELEASE — COMPRESSOR BUILDING FIRE — $195,000. A California natural gas processing plant commissioned an ESD system upgrade for its compressor trains. The ESD system design, including the SRS and logic diagram, was prepared and stamped by a licensed Electrical Engineer (PE-EE) who held no PE-CSE designation. ISA-61511 Section 11.6.3 requires that the SRS specify proof testing requirements for all SIS final elements, including partial stroke testing (PST) requirements for ESD valves in high-demand-mode applications — PST verifies valve travel to a partial open/close position during operation without requiring a full plant shutdown, providing diagnostic coverage for valve actuator and seat integrity between full proof test intervals. The PE-EE-stamped SRS specified annual full proof tests for the ESD ball valves but omitted PST specification entirely. Over the three years between installation and the incident, hydrocarbon buildup in the ball valve seats went undetected because no PST was specified or performed. During a compressor trip on high suction pressure, the ESD valve on Compressor Train 2 did not fully close due to seat seizure — the actuator travel indicator indicated closed position but the ball had not fully seated. The resulting high-pressure gas bypass into the suction header flange caused a release; a static spark ignited the gas, resulting in a fire that caused $195,000 in equipment damage and facility downtime costs. The attorney retained a licensed PE-CSE to opine on the ISA-61511 PST specification omission and causation of the valve failure.
• UNLICENSED CONSULTANT STAMPS SCADA DESIGN FOR MUNICIPAL WATER TREATMENT PLANT WITHOUT PE-CSE — IEC 62443-3-2 CYBERSECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT FOR SCADA ZONE-AND-CONDUIT MODEL NOT PERFORMED — SCADA SYSTEM HMI ACCESSIBLE VIA UNPROTECTED REMOTE ACCESS CHANNEL — UNAUTHORIZED THIRD-PARTY ACCESS TO CONTROL SYSTEM — CHLORINE DISINFECTION DOSING PUMP SET POINTS MANIPULATED — DOSING REDUCED TO 2% OF REQUIRED LEVEL FOR 6 HOURS — MUNICIPAL WATER CONSUMER ADVISORY ISSUED — $95,000 REMEDIATION AND REGULATORY RESPONSE COSTS. A California municipal water district commissioned an upgrade to the SCADA system at its primary water treatment plant. The SCADA design, including the control system architecture, HMI specifications, and remote access configuration, was prepared and stamped by an industrial automation vendor's application engineer who held no BPELSG PE-CSE designation. IEC 62443-3-2 requires a security risk assessment for SCADA designs controlling water treatment facilities, identifying security zones, conduits, security level targets (SL-T), and required cybersecurity countermeasures. The PE-CSE-lacking design included a remote access capability using a commercially available virtual network computing (VNC) application accessible via the public internet with a default password, without firewall segregation, zone isolation, or multi-factor authentication — countermeasures that would have been mandated by an IEC 62443-3-2 zone and conduit risk assessment. An unauthorized third party accessed the water treatment SCADA HMI via the unsecured remote access channel and manipulated the chlorine disinfection dosing pump set points to deliver 2% of the required residual chlorine dosing level for six continuous hours. The district's automated water quality monitoring system detected a free chlorine residual drop below the California DDW minimum 0.2 mg/L requirement; a precautionary consumer advisory was issued. Remediation, regulatory response, and security upgrade costs totaled $95,000. The attorney retained a licensed PE-CSE and IEC 62443 cybersecurity specialist to opine on the cybersecurity risk assessment omission and causation of the unauthorized access incident.

Distinct From Electrical Engineer (§ 6701 PE-EE), Mechanical Engineer (§ 6701 PE-ME), Chemical Engineer (§ 6701 PE-ChE), and CSLB C-7 Low Voltage Systems Contractor

• DISTINCT FROM Electrical Engineer (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6701 PE-EE designation) — An Electrical Engineer (PE-EE) is licensed to perform power distribution system design, arc flash hazard analysis, protective device coordination, and electrical load calculations; an Electrical Engineer may not stamp safety instrumented system functional design specifications, ISA-61511 SIL verification reports, or SCADA cybersecurity risk assessments (IEC 62443-3-2) without PE-CSE designation; a Control Systems Engineer (PE-CSE) may not stamp electrical power distribution designs, arc flash hazard studies, or protective device coordination studies without PE-EE designation: PE-EE and PE-CSE require separate BPELSG module designations; the § 6701 (PE-CSE) fee petition requires confirming absence of PE-NNNNN with PE-CSE designation for control systems engineering services, not PE-EE designation.
• DISTINCT FROM Mechanical Engineer (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6701 PE-ME designation) — A Mechanical Engineer (PE-ME) is licensed to perform HVAC system design, process piping, pressure vessel engineering, and mechanical equipment engineering; a Mechanical Engineer may not stamp safety instrumented system designs, ISA-61511 functional safety assessments, or IEC 62443-3-2 cybersecurity risk assessments; a Control Systems Engineer (PE-CSE) may not stamp HVAC system designs, process piping calculations, or pressure vessel specifications without PE-ME designation: process plants typically require both PE-CSE-stamped SIS documents and PE-ME-stamped process piping documents; neither designation authorizes practice of the other.
• DISTINCT FROM Chemical Engineer (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6701 PE-ChE designation) — A Chemical Engineer (PE-ChE) is licensed to perform chemical process design, reaction engineering, process safety analysis (PSA/HAZOP), and PHA facilitation; a Chemical Engineer may not stamp safety instrumented system functional design specifications, SIL verification reports, or SCADA cybersecurity risk assessments without PE-CSE designation; a Control Systems Engineer (PE-CSE) may not stamp chemical process flow diagrams, P&IDs requiring PE-ChE stamp authority, or process design basis documents without PE-ChE designation: PSM-covered process facilities require both PE-ChE-stamped process safety information and PE-CSE-stamped SIS documents; the LOPA is typically a joint PE-ChE/PE-CSE effort but the SIS design requires PE-CSE stamp authority.
• DISTINCT FROM CSLB Class C-7 Low Voltage Systems Contractor (Bus. & Prof. Code § 7028) — A CSLB C-7 license authorizes installation of low-voltage systems including instrumentation and control system hardware — it does NOT authorize the contractor to prepare, sign, or stamp control systems engineering design specifications, SIS functional safety documents, safety requirement specifications, or SCADA cybersecurity risk assessments: a C-7 contractor who prepares and stamps control systems engineering documents without a BPELSG PE-CSE commits § 6785 unauthorized engineering practice regardless of CSLB licensure; the contractor license authorizes system installation; the PE-CSE license authorizes engineering design document preparation and stamping.

Billing Gaps 1–3 Summary (13.25 hrs/yr = $3,975–$6,625/yr)

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