California anti-SLAPP special motion to strike CCP § 425.16(c)(1) attorney fee petition mechanics: DATE OF FILING OF SLAPP COMPLAINT as primary Welch anchor (the ONLY primary anchor in the fee-petition-mechanics series where the triggering event is a CIVIL COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST the fee-claimant — court clerk's own civil case management system records complaint filing date on court's own docket calendar entirely outside defendant attorney's scheduling control; § 425.16(c)(1) mandatory 'shall be entitled to recover' attorney fees to prevailing DEFENDANT-MOVANT — the ONLY statute in the fee-petition-mechanics series where mandatory attorney fees flow to the DEFENDANT; § 425.16(b)(1) two-prong analysis; Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 claim-by-claim protected activity analysis; distinct from § 128.5 and § 425.16(c)(2); no direct federal parallel for § 425.16's mandatory defendant-side fee-shifting in California state court → pure Ketchum no Dague), plaintiff's process server calendar, court's anti-SLAPP hearing calendar, § 425.16(g) discovery automatic stay monitoring, Court of Appeal § 425.16(i) appellate calendar, and pure Ketchum multiplier advisory (no direct federal parallel — no Ketchum/Dague split)

The SLAPP complaint analysis, § 425.16(b)(1) protected activity two-prong probability analysis, and strategic motion timing advisory at the DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT: 5.39 untracked hours = $1,617–$2,695/year

The DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT — the date on which the plaintiff's complaint is entered in the court clerk's civil case management system (Tyler Technologies Odyssey, eCourt, or the applicable superior court's own CMS) — is the primary Welch temporal anchor for CCP § 425.16(c)(1) attorney fee billing documentation. It is the ONLY primary anchor in the fee-petition-mechanics series where the triggering event is the FILING of a CIVIL COMPLAINT against the fee-claimant. The Hensley lodestar begins from this date because: (1) the complaint filing date is recorded on the court clerk's own institutional calendar entirely outside the defendant attorney's scheduling control; (2) attorney time spent from the complaint filing date analyzing the complaint's claims against § 425.16(b)(1)'s protected activity prong one, assessing the § 425.16(b)(2) prong two probability question, and advising on strategic motion timing is compensable in the § 425.16(c)(1) fee petition if the special motion prevails; (3) the § 425.16(f) 60-day special motion window runs from service on plaintiff's own process server calendar — also entirely outside defendant attorney's control — and monitoring that calendar from the complaint filing date generates immediate advisory billing; (4) the complaint filing date is the date that determines which claims the special motion can address under Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376's claim-by-claim protected activity analysis.

Section 425.16(b)(1) and the § 425.16(e) protected activity categories. Section 425.16(b)(1) provides: 'A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.' Section 425.16(e) defines 'act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech' across four categories: (a) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (b) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (c) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; and (d) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. The prong one analysis advisory call at the DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT requires mapping each cause of action in plaintiff's complaint to one of the four § 425.16(e) protected activity categories. Categories (a) and (b) — statements or writings made before legislative, executive, or judicial proceedings, or made in connection with issues under consideration by such bodies — cover petition activity (filing court documents, participating in government proceedings, submitting public comments on regulatory matters) and generally involve less dispute about the 'public issue' element. Categories (c) and (d) — statements in public forums in connection with public interest issues, and other conduct in furtherance of constitutional speech or petition rights in connection with public issues — generate more contested prong one analysis, because the 'public issue' or 'public interest' requirement under § 425.16(e)(3) and (4) has extensive California appellate case law addressing which matters constitute issues of sufficient public interest to qualify for § 425.16 protection.

Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 and claim-by-claim analysis. Before Baral, some California appellate courts applied the anti-SLAPP statute to an entire complaint if any part of the complaint arose from protected activity. Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 clarified that the § 425.16 analysis applies on a claim-by-claim basis: the anti-SLAPP special motion may only strike causes of action — or, within a cause of action, the particular allegations arising from protected activity — that themselves arise from protected activity. A complaint that asserts five causes of action, three arising from protected activity and two from non-protected activity, generates a § 425.16 special motion addressed to the three protected-activity claims only. The claim-by-claim analysis advisory at the DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT requires the defendant attorney to map each specific cause of action (and potentially each paragraph within each cause of action) to a protected activity category under § 425.16(e), identify which claims or allegations are protected-activity-based, identify which are not, and assess the prong two probability of prevailing for each protected-activity claim specifically. This claim-by-claim mapping is advisory work that arrives immediately at the complaint filing date and generates billing from the court clerk's own docket calendar entirely outside defendant attorney's scheduling control.

Strategic motion timing advisory. Section 425.16(f) creates a strategic tension in motion timing. The 60-day window runs from service on plaintiff's process server calendar — a calendar entirely outside defendant attorney's control. Filing earlier within the window activates the § 425.16(g) discovery automatic stay sooner — every day of discovery stay between the motion filing date and the court's hearing date is a day during which plaintiff cannot compel discovery against the defendant. Filing later within the window allows more time to complete the prong one and prong two analysis, obtain declarations in support, and assess plaintiff's likely prong two evidence. Filing after the 60-day window requires a showing of "good cause" for leave to file at the court's discretion under § 425.16(f) — a separate procedural showing on the court's own calendar that itself generates advisory billing. The strategic timing advisory arrives at each milestone in the § 425.16(f) window: when service is confirmed (start of the 60-day period on plaintiff's own calendar), when preliminary prong one and prong two analysis is complete (motion readiness assessment), and when the 60-day deadline approaches (final timing decision advisory). All three advisory call types arrive at events driven by calendars outside defendant attorney's control. At 55% untracked: 7 clients × 2 calls × 42 min × 55% = 5.39 hrs = $1,617–$2,695/year at $300–$500/hr.

The plaintiff's process server calendar, court's anti-SLAPP hearing calendar, § 425.16(g) discovery automatic stay monitoring, and Court of Appeal § 425.16(i) appellate calendar advisory call cycle: 7.26 untracked hours = $2,178–$3,630/year

California CCP § 425.16(c)(1) anti-SLAPP practice generates four concurrent external institutional calendars entirely outside the defendant attorney's scheduling control — the plaintiff's process server calendar, the court's anti-SLAPP hearing calendar, the court's § 425.16(g) discovery stay mechanism, and the Court of Appeal's § 425.16(i) appellate calendar. Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122. PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084. Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424 (lodestar from DATE OF FILING OF SLAPP COMPLAINT). Missouri v. Jenkins (1989) 491 U.S. 274 (fees-on-fees).

Plaintiff's process server calendar. Section 425.16(f) conditions the 60-day special motion window on the SERVICE date, not the complaint FILING date: 'The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint.' Service is accomplished on plaintiff's own schedule using plaintiff's chosen service method. Personal service by a licensed process server, substituted service under Code of Civil Procedure § 415.20, service by certified mail under CCP § 415.30, or acknowledgment of service under CCP § 415.30 are all executed on plaintiff's own service calendar entirely outside the defendant attorney's scheduling control. A complaint filed on the first business day of any month may not be served until six to eight weeks later on plaintiff's own service calendar — and the defendant attorney does not know the precise 60-day motion deadline until receipt of a proof of service showing the service date on plaintiff's own calendar. The difference between a complaint filing date and a service date can be substantial: plaintiffs sometimes file complaints months before serving them to preserve statute of limitations, to investigate the case before service, or to negotiate prior to commencing litigation. Monitoring the plaintiff's service calendar generates the first category of advisory billing in § 425.16(c)(1) practice — the defendant attorney must track when proof of service is filed on the court's docket (reflecting the service date on plaintiff's own calendar) to compute the exact § 425.16(f) deadline and to ensure the special motion is filed within the window.

Court's anti-SLAPP hearing calendar and opposition and reply deadlines. Once the special motion is filed and served, the court clerk schedules the hearing on the court's own calendar. Section 425.16(f) requires the clerk to schedule the hearing 'not more than 30 days after the service of the motion on the plaintiff, unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.' The court clerk's own calendar — not the defendant attorney's calendar — sets the hearing date. In courts with heavy anti-SLAPP motion practice (Los Angeles Superior Court, San Francisco Superior Court, San Diego Superior Court), docket conditions routinely require hearings set 45 to 60 days after filing. The hearing date set by the court clerk determines two downstream filing deadlines that cascade from the court's own calendar: opposition papers are due 9 court days before the hearing under California Rules of Court rule 3.1300(a), and reply papers are due 5 court days before the hearing. Both of these deadlines are computed backwards from the court-clerk-set hearing date — a date entirely outside the defendant attorney's scheduling control. Advisory calls arrive when the court clerk's hearing notice is issued (triggering the computation of opposition and reply deadlines from the court's own calendar), when plaintiff files opposition (triggering the reply deadline on the court's own calendar), and when the court posts a tentative ruling on the court's own online publication system (if the court uses the tentative ruling system) on the court's own announcement calendar.

Section 425.16(g) discovery automatic stay monitoring throughout the stay period. The § 425.16(g) discovery automatic stay is one of the most operationally significant features of anti-SLAPP practice — it suspends all discovery proceedings by operation of law the moment the defendant files the special motion, without any separate court order. The stay remains in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion. During the stay period, the defendant attorney must monitor: (a) whether plaintiff files a noticed motion for good-cause relief from the stay under § 425.16(g)'s proviso that 'the court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this section' — plaintiff's own counsel decides when to file this motion, and the motion is calendared for hearing on the court's own calendar entirely outside defendant attorney's control; (b) if good-cause relief is granted for specified discovery, the court-ordered production schedule runs on the court's own calendar; (c) any pre-existing discovery obligations (interrogatories, deposition notices, document requests that were served before the special motion was filed) are stayed on the court's own stay mechanism and monitoring of their status generates advisory billing during the stay period; (d) the lifting of the stay upon notice of entry of the ruling generates immediate advisory billing if the stay is lifted after a denial (because all discovery obligations that were stayed resume immediately) — notice of entry is filed or issued on the court's own docket calendar. The § 425.16(g) discovery stay monitoring advisory calls arrive throughout the stay period — a period whose duration is set entirely by the court's hearing calendar and ruling timeline.

Court of Appeal § 425.16(i) appellate calendar — both grant and denial. Section 425.16(i) provides: 'An order granting or denying a special motion to strike shall be appealable under Section 904.1.' This provision makes both outcomes of the anti-SLAPP motion immediately appealable as of right — an unusual procedural feature that creates two distinct appellate billing tracks entirely on the Court of Appeal's own institutional calendar. If the special motion is GRANTED and plaintiff appeals the grant: the § 916 automatic stay suspends all trial court proceedings during the appeal; the Court of Appeal's own briefing schedule controls — the parties cannot negotiate the briefing schedule with the appellate court; California Rules of Court rule 8.360 sets the opening brief due 30 days after the court reporter certifies the record, respondent's brief due 30 days after the opening brief, and reply brief due 20 days after the respondent's brief; oral argument is set on the Court of Appeal's own argument calendar, often six to twelve months after briefing is complete. If the special motion is DENIED and defendant appeals the denial: trial court proceedings are not automatically stayed (CCP § 916 does not apply to a denial); defendant must file a Writ of Supersedeas petition with the Court of Appeal under CCP § 923 to seek a stay of the trial court proceedings pending the appeal; the Court of Appeal processes the writ petition on the Court of Appeal's own writ calendar entirely outside defendant attorney's scheduling control; if the writ is granted, a temporary stay issues and the appellate briefing proceeds; if the writ is denied, the trial and appellate proceedings run concurrently. All Court of Appeal briefing and argument deadlines in both appellate tracks are set on the appellate court's own institutional calendar entirely outside attorney's scheduling control. At 55% untracked: 6 clients × 3 calls × 44 min × 55% = 7.26 hrs = $2,178–$3,630/year at $300–$500/hr.

The § 425.16(c)(1) mandatory fee petition + lodestar from DATE OF FILING OF SLAPP COMPLAINT + pure Ketchum multiplier (no direct federal parallel for § 425.16's mandatory defendant-side fee-shifting in California state court — no Ketchum/Dague split) advisory call cycle: 4.03 untracked hours = $1,210–$2,017/year

California CCP § 425.16(c)(1) creates a structurally distinctive fee petition environment for two compounding reasons: (1) § 425.16(c)(1) imposes a mandatory 'shall be entitled to recover' obligation — the prevailing defendant on the special motion is entitled to attorney fees and costs as a matter of right, with no judicial discretion to deny fees to a prevailing defendant-movant; and (2) there is no direct federal parallel for § 425.16's mandatory defendant-side fee-shifting applicable in California state court proceedings, meaning the § 425.16(c)(1) fee petition in California Superior Court is purely Ketchum multiplier eligible under Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122 without any City of Burlington v. Dague (1992) 505 U.S. 557 no-multiplier constraint.

§ 425.16(c)(1) fee petition component assembly from DATE OF FILING OF SLAPP COMPLAINT. The § 425.16(c)(1) fee petition requires a Hensley lodestar from the DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT through final resolution. The component structure covers: (a) Complaint receipt and § 425.16(b)(1) protected activity analysis hours — hours spent from the complaint filing date analyzing which causes of action arise from protected activity under § 425.16(e)'s four categories, conducting the Baral v. Schnitt (2016) claim-by-claim analysis, and drafting the prong one arguments; these hours are compensable from the DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT as the Hensley lodestar start; (b) § 425.16(b)(2) probability of prevailing analysis hours — hours spent assessing the strength and admissibility of plaintiff's likely prong two evidence for each protected-activity claim, conducting legal research on the elements of each claim subject to the motion, obtaining declarations or evidence for the motion record; (c) § 425.16(f) motion timing and preparation hours — hours spent monitoring plaintiff's process server calendar to confirm service date, computing the 60-day motion deadline, drafting the special motion and supporting memorandum, obtaining declarations in support, and determining optimal filing timing for the § 425.16(g) discovery stay activation; (d) § 425.16(g) discovery stay monitoring hours — hours spent monitoring the automatic stay, responding to plaintiff's good-cause relief motions on the court's own calendar, and tracking court-ordered specified discovery obligations during the stay; (e) Court hearing calendar monitoring and preparation hours — hours spent monitoring the court's own hearing calendar for the date set by the court clerk, preparing opposition response and reply briefs to meet the court-calendar-computed deadlines, researching and preparing the tentative ruling response; (f) § 425.16(i) appellate hours if appeal filed — hours spent in Court of Appeal briefing and argument under the Court of Appeal's own briefing calendar whether defendant appeals a denial or responds to plaintiff's appeal of a grant; (g) Missouri v. Jenkins (1989) 491 U.S. 274 fees-on-fees: hours spent preparing and litigating the § 425.16(c)(1) fee petition itself are compensable from the fee petition preparation date as a secondary lodestar anchor. A § 425.16(c)(1) fee petition that begins the Hensley lodestar at the special motion filing date rather than at the complaint filing date misses all pre-motion hours (complaint analysis, protected activity research, prong one and prong two analysis, service monitoring) — a systematic undercount that reduces the fee award and the available Ketchum multiplier base.

§ 425.16(c)(2) reverse-fee advisory. Section 425.16(c)(2) contains the mirror-image fee provision that distinguishes § 425.16(c)(1) from frivolous motion practice: 'if the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5.' If a defendant files a special motion to strike that the court finds frivolous — i.e., the motion had no reasonable basis in law or fact under Baral v. Schnitt's claim-by-claim analysis — or was filed solely to cause unnecessary delay, § 425.16(c)(2) mandates attorney fees and costs to the plaintiff. This is the only situation in § 425.16(c) where fees flow to the plaintiff rather than the defendant. The § 425.16(c)(2) reverse-fee risk advisory arrives at the same time as the § 425.16(b)(1) prong one analysis — if the defendant attorney's assessment of prong one concludes that the defendant's conduct does not clearly arise from protected activity and the motion's protected activity arguments are weak, the § 425.16(c)(2) frivolous-motion risk must be disclosed to the client before the special motion is filed. A defendant attorney who files a clearly meritless anti-SLAPP motion without advising the client of the § 425.16(c)(2) reverse-fee exposure has failed to discharge the § 425.16(c)(2) advisory obligation — a billing gap that ClaimHour captures as a complaint-date advisory call rather than a motion-filing advisory call.

No direct federal parallel for § 425.16 — pure Ketchum in California Superior Court. California's anti-SLAPP statute — CCP § 425.16 — is California state procedural law applicable in California state court civil proceedings. Federal courts in the Ninth Circuit have been divided about whether § 425.16 applies as California state procedural law in federal diversity jurisdiction cases: the Ninth Circuit held in U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (9th Cir. 1990) that § 425.16 does not apply in federal court because it is procedural (not substantive state law) and is incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Subsequent circuit-level and district court decisions have varied. But regardless of the application debate in federal court, the critical point for the § 425.16(c)(1) fee petition in California Superior Court is: there is no federal anti-SLAPP statute that creates a parallel Dague-track fee petition for the same California state court anti-SLAPP proceeding. The Dague constraint under City of Burlington v. Dague (1992) 505 U.S. 557 applies when a California state law fee petition has a federal statutory analog creating a concurrent Dague-track fee petition — for example, FEHA § 12965(b) and concurrent Title VII § 2000e-5(k), CFRA § 12945.2 and concurrent FMLA § 2617(a)(3), CIPA § 637.2 and concurrent federal Wiretap Act § 2520, Unruh § 52 and concurrent ADA § 12205. California's § 425.16 has no such federal statutory analog creating a concurrent mandatory Dague-track anti-SLAPP fee petition in federal district court. The result: a § 425.16(c)(1) fee petition filed in California Superior Court is purely Ketchum multiplier eligible — no Dague split, no Hensley segregation between a Ketchum track and a Dague track, no federal district court filing required to exhaust a parallel federal claim that creates Dague exposure.

Ketchum five-factor multiplier analysis at the DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT. For § 425.16(c)(1) fee petitions in California Superior Court, Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122 authorizes a positive multiplier on the lodestar when the contingency factors at inception justify one. The five Ketchum factors in § 425.16(c)(1) anti-SLAPP practice, each assessed at the DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT, are: (a) § 425.16(b)(1) prong one protected activity uncertainty — whether each specific cause of action in plaintiff's complaint arose from defendant's act in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue was a legal and factual question that was genuinely uncertain at the DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT; the extensive California appellate case law on the 'public issue' requirement for § 425.16(e)(3) and (4), the Baral v. Schnitt (2016) claim-by-claim analysis requirement, and the fact-specific nature of the protected activity assessment all create legitimate prong one uncertainty from the complaint filing date; (b) § 425.16(b)(2) prong two probability uncertainty — whether the defendant would be able to demonstrate that plaintiff could not establish a probability of prevailing on the prong-one-qualifying causes of action was uncertain at the complaint filing date; the prong two assessment depends on the admissibility and strength of plaintiff's own evidence, which was not known to the defendant at the DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT; (c) § 425.16(f) timing uncertainty — whether the special motion could be filed within the 60-day window running from service on plaintiff's own process server calendar was uncertain at the complaint filing date because the service date — and therefore the precise 60-day deadline — was on plaintiff's own calendar entirely outside defendant's control; a missed 60-day deadline would require a showing of good cause for discretionary leave to file at the court's own discretion, an uncertain procedural outcome; (d) § 425.16(g) discovery stay lifting uncertainty — whether plaintiff would seek good-cause relief from the automatic discovery stay, whether such relief would be granted on the court's own hearing calendar, and whether court-ordered specified discovery during the stay would impose obligations on a court-set schedule entirely outside defendant's control was uncertain at the complaint filing date; (e) § 425.16(i) appellate uncertainty — whether the Court of Appeal's own appellate calendar would be engaged by either a denial (defendant would appeal) or a grant (plaintiff would appeal), creating an appellate briefing track on the Court of Appeal's own institutional calendar entirely outside attorney control, was uncertain at the DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT. PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084: the court determines the reasonable hourly rate based on the prevailing market rate in the community for comparable legal services in California anti-SLAPP litigation. Missouri v. Jenkins (1989) 491 U.S. 274: hours spent preparing the § 425.16(c)(1) fee petition itself are compensable as fees-on-fees from the fee petition preparation date as a secondary lodestar anchor. Arithmetic: 5 clients × 2 calls × 44 min × 55% = 4.03 hrs = $1,210–$2,017/year at $300–$500/hr.

How ClaimHour fits California CCP § 425.16(c)(1) anti-SLAPP attorney fee practice

California CCP § 425.16(c)(1) anti-SLAPP solos billing hourly on mandatory defendant-side attorney fees — with SLAPP complaint analysis and § 425.16(b)(1) protected activity and § 425.16(b)(2) probability analysis advisory calls arriving at the DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT on the court clerk's own institutional docket calendar (the ONLY primary anchor in the fee-petition-mechanics series in a CIVIL COMPLAINT FILING DATE where the DEFENDANT is the fee claimant; court clerk's own civil case management system records filing date entirely outside defendant attorney's scheduling control; § 425.16(c)(1) mandatory fees to prevailing defendant-movant — ONLY statute in the series where mandatory attorney fees flow to the DEFENDANT; § 425.16(f) 60-day window runs from service on plaintiff's own process server calendar; § 425.16(g) discovery automatic stay activates upon special motion filing; § 425.16(i) interlocutory appeal available on both grant and denial on Court of Appeal's own calendar; no direct federal parallel in California state court → no Ketchum/Dague split; pure Ketchum multiplier eligible; DISTINCT from § 128.5 bad faith sanctions; DISTINCT from § 425.16(c)(2) frivolous anti-SLAPP motion fees to plaintiff; DISTINCT from § 1021.5 private attorney general plaintiff's fee petition), plaintiff's process server calendar advisory calls entirely outside defendant attorney's scheduling control, court's anti-SLAPP hearing calendar advisory calls set by court clerk on court's own calendar, § 425.16(g) discovery automatic stay monitoring advisory calls throughout the stay period on court's own stay mechanism, Court of Appeal § 425.16(i) appellate calendar advisory calls on appellate briefing schedule entirely outside attorney's control on both grant-appeal and denial-appeal tracks, and § 425.16(c)(1) mandatory fee petition and pure Ketchum multiplier advisory calls arriving at grant of special motion — and if your § 425.16(c)(1) lodestar documentation must satisfy the Hensley contemporaneous-record standard from the DATE OF FILING OF THE SLAPP COMPLAINT through complaint analysis, service monitoring, motion preparation, discovery stay monitoring, hearing preparation, § 425.16(i) appellate proceedings (if any), and fee petition, ClaimHour was built for that gap.

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